

VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDR #1089/01 1841011
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031011Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4256
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 3016
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0013
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0149
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0054
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCQSOC/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 001089

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2026

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PTER](#) [PREL](#) [EAID](#)

SUBJECT: (CORRECTED COPY) CT IN HORN OF AFRICA; RESULTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM MAY 23-24 RSI CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission D. Purnell Delly, Reasons
1.4 (B) and (D).

11. (S REL AUS UK CAN) SUMMARY: U.S. Chiefs of Mission and other Mission representatives from Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Sudan met in Nairobi May 23-24 to discuss regional counterterrorism strategy with Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism Hank Crumpton, Commander CJTF-HOA Admiral Richard Hunt, and other senior U.S. interagency representatives. The third of its kind in a geographic region, this Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) meeting sought to promote a coordinated regional CT strategy for the Horn of Africa, maximizing efforts of all USG agencies including CENTCOM, CJTF-HOA, USAID and the National Counterterrorism Center. The COMs found it impossible to agree on an overarching regional counterterrorism strategy because there was no consensus on Somalia-specific recommendations. There was, however, general agreement by all present that the following elements would be valuable components of a regional counterterrorism strategy for the Horn of Africa:

1) establishing comprehensive programs to eliminate regional terrorist safe havens (both actual and potential), and to address social-economic-political conditions that terrorists exploit;

2) building international partnerships to support these goals

12. (S REL AUS UK CAN) Key programs Chiefs of Mission endorsed were: strengthened Rule of Law programs in each of the countries of the region; greater Muslim outreach programs including an immediate increase of quick return, high-visibility assistance programs such as the Ambassador's Self-help Program; and programs to limit terrorist mobility by enhancing border and coastal security. Follow-up meetings in the coming months, as well as a Regional (CT) Program Plan being drafted by AmEmbassy Dar Es Salaam in coordination with other Missions and their country teams, will measure progress on these objectives and ensure continued focus on a common regional CT strategy. END SUMMARY.

TERRORIST THREAT IN THE HORN

13. (S REL AUS UK CAN) Chiefs of Mission agreed that the Ogaden, the Eastleigh neighborhood in Nairobi, and the Swahili Coast including Tanzania were low-level or potential terrorist safe havens. Parts of Yemen could be termed proto safe havens. Somalia is the epicenter of terrorist activity in the region, an active safe haven qualitatively different from others in the world because it overlays a failed state. The al Qaida presence in Mogadishu is part of a larger network, al Qaida East Africa (AQEA), which maintains operatives, facilitators and associates in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Djibouti, Ethiopia and probably Sudan and Eritrea. AQEA has close ties to al Qaida core leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and has links to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Yemen and appears to be funded by sources in these countries as well as the Somali diaspora.

14. (S REL AUS UK CAN) Kenya and Djibouti are primary attack venues. The Kenyan AQ cell is rebuilding after the release from Kenyan custody of key AQ operative Aboud Rogo. We are unsure of the AQ presence in Ethiopia, but AQ operatives may attempt to take advantage of grievances and instability resulting from the ongoing insurgency in the Ogaden. Yemen serves as a source country for terrorists and a transit point for people and weapons. The government has had considerable success in tackling terrorist leadership, but has had little success in dampening the spread of radical Islam. The Government views instability in Somalia as the biggest cross-border threat to Yemen. However, the fragility of the Yemeni government remains a serious concern.

STRATEGIC GOAL ONE: ELIMINATING TERRORIST SAFE HAVEN

15. (S REL AUS UK CAN) A key objective of regional CT programs must be to deny terrorists the ability to conduct military training, plan operations, recruit, and transit within the region. Such programs must further, over the long term, create the social-political-economic conditions and underlying stability inimical to terrorist networks. COMS also noted the importance of following through on promised programs, quick delivery, and personal diplomacy (meaning that short TDYs were less effective and language ability essential). Chiefs of Mission noted the importance of "changing the conversation" about current events in Somalia away from fighting in Mogadishu to positive U.S. steps to support the TFG and restore Somali institutions. Specifically, the group recommended:

Immediate

A) Immediately increase budget for high-impact, quick-delivery assistance programs in safe haven areas across the region (including the Swahili Coast and Tanzania), particularly:

-- the Ambassador's Self-help Program in RSI participant countries. This program enjoyed considerable success under the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (FY03-04); and

-- CJTF-HOA civil affairs (CA) programs in RSI participant countries, including Tanzania. COMs urged closer integration of CA teams with USAID and other Embassy elements, possibly to include interagency-led CA programs in the future

B) Increase Muslim outreach efforts, focusing on areas of instability:

-- Upgrade VOA programming in the Horn. In addition to countering an extremely successful jihadist propaganda campaign, the restoration of Somali language programming after a nine-year hiatus would have an important symbolic effect.

-- "Add Zeroes" to existing successful programs (e.g.

program not 8 but 80 International Visitors). Increase regional programming coordination to achieve economies of scale with American speakers and other programs.

-- Chiefs of Mission expressed interest in partnership with private organizations; e.g., a State Department-sponsored effort to connect American Muslims with their East African counterparts, perhaps by connecting U.S. mosques or Islamic Associations to East African counterparts. COMs suggested such partnerships were a potential area for exploration by U/S Hughes, Brain Trust.

-- Chiefs of Mission also noted the importance of calibrating programs so that Muslim communities did not perceive that the USG was bearing down on them.

Specific Short-term Recommendations Included:

A) Increase collection and analytical efforts to "map" the East African safe haven, to include Somalia as a whole, as well as tertiary safe havens of the Somali Coast, tribal areas in Yemen, the Ogaden, and Eastleigh, noting both potential sources of extremism and potential USG partners, extremists, funding sources, Saudi and other foreign influence, and potential new safe havens if the primary safe haven in Mogadishu is eliminated. We also need additional information on activities of the Somali diaspora, particularly in the U.S. and Europe. We need to overlay GIS data with information from the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body;

B) Engaging all regional embassies in reporting on and providing local government views on how to deal with terrorism in the Horn and in Somalia. One possibility is to provide Somalia watcher positions at all regional embassies, including locally engaged staff.

Short to Medium Term

A) Improve Rule of Law programs throughout the region, focusing on police and prosecutorial training, implementation of effective CT legislation, regional legal cooperation (e.g. Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition treaties between Horn countries), assistance to TFG efforts to draft a constitution for Somalia, and prisons.

B) Improving land and maritime border control and port security is key to restricting terrorist travel and to developing regional prosperity. Coordinated international donor and U.S. interagency assistance could facilitate host nation controls over the Gulf of Aden and Somali and Swahili coasts, significant areas of terrorist transit, piracy, and arms and human trafficking. Potential programs include:

--Department of Homeland Security, including its Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Coast Guard could assist host nations with training programs for local border officials to improve monitoring and interdiction of terrorists. Training should include officials from across the region.

--Immediate steps should be taken, facilitated by the U.S. military where appropriate, to encourage better cross-border cooperation between Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti.

--A regional ISPS Port Security Training Program conducted in the IMO Regional Office in Mombassa would make an important contribution to border security. (Potential funding sources: S/CT, EB, INL, and AF)

--Chiefs of Mission also recommended increased TIP/PISCES funding to fully implement and interconnect programs in countries in the region.

C) Participants acknowledged both the urgency and the difficulty of encouraging better intelligence sharing

between countries in the region.

Somalia Specific Recommendations included:

A) One program which should be funded immediately is USG assistance to the Government of Kenya to help speed up Kenyan training of Somali police. The Kenyans have sponsored 200 Somalis, participation in police training in Kenya and have offered to train a total of 5,000, but lack the resources to do so. (Potential funding source: S/CT ATA funds). Chiefs of Mission noted that these programs would provide important governance as well as CT benefits, particularly in countries with poor human rights and corruption records. Potential international partners include UNODC and the International Association of Prosecutors.

B) USAID noted and Chiefs of Mission agreed that Rule of Law programs were extraordinarily difficult to implement in Somalia when, for example, Somali primary school enrollment was only 20%. Chiefs of Mission strongly supported USAID's request for \$20 million in FY-07 funds for programs focused on Muslim youth in the region to address the conditions that terrorists exploit.

Long Term

-- Expand development assistance programs to address the underlying conditions for terrorist recruitment. Such activities would include: working with governments to help them become more effective and responsive to citizens' needs; helping governments better respond to social service needs, particularly in the areas of education, health, and sanitation; and rehabilitating basic infrastructure associated with such service delivery.

STRATEGIC GOAL TWO: ENCOURAGE REGIONAL

AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

16. (S REL AUS UK CAN) We should facilitate regional and international cooperation to restore political stability in troubled areas of the Horn (especially Somalia), stem the tide of Islamic radicalism, and eliminate environments conducive to hatred and violence throughout the region. Such cooperation may include coordination through the Arab League to establish links with moderate Islamic bodies, cooperation with the UN on reconciliation efforts inside Somalia, and work with IGAD countries plus Tanzania to develop necessary regional support mechanisms for the TFIs. Chiefs of Mission noted that African peacekeeping assistance would likely be key to restoring Somalia's stability, but most African militaries lack the capacity to deploy there now, and there are sensitivities about which African countries may participate. Chiefs of Mission discussed the impact of Ethiopian insurgencies on regional stability and safe havens, and the possibility of providing counterinsurgency training (including human rights training) to the GOE.

Next Steps

17. (C) Chiefs of Mission agreed to meet again on the margins of the Africa COMs Conference in October and suggested AmEmbassy Asmara's inclusion in future meetings. The next meeting will assess the regional terrorist threat, examine RSI efforts to date, and discuss the applicability of a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TS/CTI)-like program to the Horn of Africa. Embassy Dar Es Salaam will draft a Regional (CT) Program Plan (a & Regional MPP8), with specific programs, timelines and metrics to measure the impact of programs on the terrorist enemy. S/CT will fund a meeting to finalize the draft if required.

18. Meeting Participants

--Nairobi: Ambassador Mark Bellamy (did not clear); Chris Bane, Regional Affairs

--Djibouti: Ambassador Marguerita Ragsdale; Nicholas Siegel, Regional Affairs

--Sanaa: Ambassador Thomas Krajeski

--Addis Ababa: Charge Vicki Huddleston; Brent Bahl, Regional Affairs

--Dar Es Salaam: Charge Purnell Delly; Mark Andersen, Regional Affairs

--Khartoum: Keith Kelly, Regional Affairs

--Department of State: S/CT Coordinator Ambassador Hank Crumpton; AF/FO Ambassador Don Yamamoto; Virginia Palmer, S/CT Deputy Coordinator; David Kilcullen, Chief Strategist; Eunice Reddick, Director, Office of East African Affairs

--DOD: Rear Admiral Rick Hunt, Commander CJTF-HOA; Brigadier General (Select) Mark Schissler, Joint Staff; Michael Dumont, Special Assistant, OSD OSD/SOLIC; Rear Admiral (Select) Ed Winters, SOCOM

--NSA: Lonny Anderson

--NCTC: Carol Burans, Deputy Director, Strategic Operational Planning

--CTC: Edward Gistaro, Sarah Pease

--CIA: Stephan Milliken, Africa Division

--DOJ: Carl Alexandre, Director, Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training Office

--USAID: Andrew Sisson, REDSO Director

WHITE